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EDGEWORTH AND LINDAHL–FOLEY EQUILIBRIA
OF A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
WITH PRIVATE PROVISION OF PURE PUBLIC GOODS
MONIQUE FLORENZANO
CNRS–CERMSEM, MSE Universite´ Paris 1
ELENA L. del MERCATO
Universita` degli Studi di Salerno
Abstract. In this paper, we propose a definition of Edgeworth equilibrium for a private own-
ership production economy with (possibly infinitely) many private goods and a finite number
of pure public goods. We show that Edgeworth equilibria exist whatever be the dimension of
the private goods space and can be decentralized, in the finite and infinite dimensional cases, as
Lindahl–Foley equilibria. Existence theorems for Lindahl–Foley equilibria are a by-product of
our results.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider a private ownership production economy with (possibly infinitely)
many private goods and a finite number of pure public goods. Finitely many households have
an initial endowment of private goods and jointly consume private goods and a same amount of
public goods; this amount of public goods is jointly produced with private goods by finitely many
competitive firms.
In such a model, financing the production of public goods can be thought of in two different ways.
Either, following Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2001), households are supposed to make voluntary
purchases (or privately provide amounts) of public goods, determining the total provision of public
goods entering in the utility function of each household. The economic meaning of this approach is
justified by the existence of private donations to charity and many other examples where a public
good is provided in a market without government involvement. Or, in a Lindahlian approach,
households are allowed to pay for the total amount of public goods a personalized price, the sum of
personalized prices determining the public good vector price used by the competitive firms. As long
as no equilibrium concept is defined, both formalizations are obviously equivalent. In counterpart,
two different equilibrium concepts can be defined which differ by the optimization problem solved
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2by households at equilibrium. In the classical line of general equilibrium with preferences depending
on the consumption of the other consumers, households may be assumed to take their own provision
decision taking as given not only the market prices but also the provision decisions of the other
households. Then prices, individual consumptions of private goods and individual provisions of
public goods arise from the competitive functioning of the productive system and the market
clearing. This is the equilibrium concept studied by Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2001, 2003). Such
an equilibrium can easily be shown to be constrained optimal (for an optimality notion where the
choices of each household are constrained by the choices of the other households). It has no reason
to be Pareto optimal, for the optimality notion commonly adopted in a public good framework
and that we use in this paper. On the other hand, in the line of Foley (1970), households may
be assumed to consume private goods and to claim an amount of public goods taking as given
the private good prices and their personalized vector of public good prices. Then, personalized
prices and the equilibrium allocation arise from the competitive functioning of the productive
system and the market clearing. As shown by Foley in the case of a convex and constant returns
technology, such an equilibrium is optimal for the optimality notion corresponding to the public
good framework, and belongs to the core of the economy.
Coherent with this definition of optimality, the main result of this paper is the definition and
existence of Edgeworth equilibria for our economy. Since prices are not involved in optimality,
core and limit-core concepts, we adapt the classical definitions to the public good model in the
Villanacci–Zenginobuz framework that we set in Section 2. This adaptation, done in Section 3, is
not trivial. In particular, the definition of blocking for coalitions of replica economies requires some
caution. It is known (see for example Conley 1994) that if blocking is defined in replica economies
as it is defined for coalitions of the original economy, then the core of a public goods economy may
not converge as the economy gets large. Our concept of blocking in replica economies is justified
by the consideration of the aspects of crowding and congestion. The idea is that for most of
public goods, the appreciation we have is dependent on the “size” of the group of consumers of the
same type in the coalition (see Section 4 of Milleron 1972 who suggests the idea, see Section 2 of
Vasil’ev 1994-96, and Vasil’ev, Weber and Wiesmeth 1995 who focus on the equivalence theorem).
Non-emptiness of the core and, with the definition of blocking we propose for replica economies,
existence of Edgeworth equilibria for a convex economy with private provision of public goods are
shown in Section 4 under some classical assumptions on the model. Since we work with utility
functions, we prove the non-emptiness of the core using Scarf’s theorem (actually, an extension of
Scarf’s theorem). The existence of Edgeworth equilibria is classically proved using compactness
arguments.
We then look for decentralization with prices of an Edgeworth equilibrium allocation so as to
get at least a quasiequilibrium of the model. It appears that the equilibrium concept adapted to
our concept of Edgeworth equilibrium is that of Lindahl–Foley equilibrium that we precisely define
in Section 5. As known since Foley (1970) and Milleron (1972), this equilibrium can be seen as the
equilibrium of an economy with only private goods defined on an enlarged commodity space. We
follow this strategy and study the correspondence between optimality, core and limit-core concepts
in the economy with public goods and the usual corresponding concepts in the enlarged economy.
Decentralization in the public good economy is then driven by known results of decentralization
in the enlarged economy. This decentralization is studied first in a finite dimensional setting.
Existence theorems for Lindahl–Foley equilibrium are a by-product of our two results of existence
of Edgeworth equilibria and of their decentralization as Lindahl–Foley equilibria. Equivalence and
existence theorems for Lindahl–Foley equilibria are obtained under weaker assumptions than in the
3literature. When, in order to model time and uncertainty, the private commodity space is assumed
to be infinite dimensional, the same results involve structural assumptions on the commodity–price
duality of the model and properness assumptions borrowed from Tourky (1998, 1999).
To end, it is worth noticing that our results strongly rely on the convexity assumptions made
in particular on the production of public goods. The private production of public goods, and the
related convexity assumptions, distinguish our model from a different approach to the pure theory
of public goods, initiated by Mas-Colell (1980) and studied by Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989),
Weber and Wiesmeth (1991), Diamantaras and Gilles (1996), De Simone and Graziano (2004),
where aside a convex private ownership economy there is a set (with or without linear structure) of
public projects each one characterized by a cost in terms of private goods. These authors develop a
notion of valuation equilibrium in which the public project is financed through a nonlinear system
of personalized prices called valuation system, and they show the first and second welfare theorems.
As pointed out by Mas-Colell (1980), when the set of public projects has a linear structure and the
valuation system is restricted to be linear homogeneous, then the concept of a valuation equilibrium
coincides with the concept of (valuation) Lindahl equilibrium. Moreover, with only one private
good, as shown by Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989), a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium is a particular
case of valuation equilibrium (called linear cost share equilibrium). If in addition, the cost function
is convex, proving the existence of Edgeworth equilibria that we decentralize as Lindahl–Foley
equilibria, we go further than these authors. But the main interest of their approach is precisely
to deal with the nonlinear and nonconvex cases.
2. The model
We consider a production economy with a (possibly infinite dimensional) private commodity
space L and private provisions of a finite number K of public goods
E =
(
〈L× RK , L′ × RK〉, (Xh, uh, eh)h∈H , (Yf )f∈F , (θh,f )h∈H
f∈F
)
.
• 〈L,L′〉 is a pair of vector spaces and an associated bilinear functional 〈·, ·〉 that separates
points, so that 〈L × RK , L′ × RK〉 represents the commodity–price duality of the model.
As usual, we will denote by (p, pg) · (z, zg) = p ·z+pg ·zg the evaluation of (z, zg) ∈ L×RK
at prices (p, pg) ∈ L′ × RK . We assume moreover that L is a partially ordered vector
space, while RK is canonically ordered. In the case of a finite number of private goods, L
is some Euclidean space RC , which will be equipped with its canonical topology, and L′ is
identified with RC .
• There is a finite setH of households. Each household h has the positive coneXh = L+×R
K
+
of the commodity space as choice set and an initial endowment eh = (ωh, 0) ∈ L+ × {0},
that is, no initial endowment in public goods. For a generic element (xh, x
g
h) ∈ L+ × R
K
+
of h’s choice set, xh ∈ L+ is the private commodity consumption of household h, while the
components of the vector xgh ∈ R
K
+ denote the amount of each public good that household
h provides. Household h’s preferences depend on the provision of public goods of the other
agents and are represented by a utility function uh : L+ × R
K
+ → R,
(xh,
∑
h′∈H
xgh′)→ uh(xh,
∑
h′∈H
xgh′)
defined over his consumption of private goods and the total provision of public goods G =∑
h′∈H x
g
h′ .
4• There is a finite set F of firms which jointly produce private and public goods. Each firm
is characterized by a production set Yf ⊂ L× R
K
+ . We denote by (yf , y
g
f ) a generic point
of Yf . Y =
∑
f∈F Yf denotes the total production set.
• For every firm f and each household h, the firm shares 0 ≤ θh,f ≤ 1 classically represent
a contractual claim of household h on the profit of firm f when it faces a price (p, pg) ∈
L′ × RK . In a core and Edgeworth equilibrium approach, the relative shares θh,f reflect
household’s stock holdings which represent proprietorships of production possibilities and
θh,fYf is interpreted as a technology set at h’s disposal in Yf . As usual,
∑
h∈H θh,f = 1,
for each f .
Let ω denote the total endowment of private goods, that is,
∑
h∈H eh = (ω, 0). An allocation is a
t-uple
(
(xh, x
g
h)h∈H , (yf , y
g
f )f∈F
)
∈ (L+ × R
K
+ )
H ×
∏
f∈F Yf . By abuse of language, we speak of
(xh, x
g
h)h∈H as a consumption allocation when we should speak of a consumers’ choice allocation.
The allocation
(
(xh, x
g
h)h∈H , (yf , y
g
f )f∈F
)
is feasible if∑
h∈H
(xh, x
g
h) = (ω, 0) +
∑
f∈F
(yf , y
g
f ).
As usual, A(E) denotes the set of feasible allocations. Using the appropriate projections of this
set on (L+ × R
K
+ )
H , on each copy Xh of L+ × R
K
+ and on each Yf , let X̂, X̂h for each h ∈ H,
Ŷf for each f ∈ F , respectively denote the set of feasible consumption allocations, and the feasible
choice sets for each household and each firm. Let σ be a topology on L non necessarily compatible
with the duality 〈L,L′〉 and let τRK denote the canonical topology on R
K . We will maintain in
the whole paper the following set of minimal assumptions on the economy E called in the sequel
standard assumptions:
A1: For each h ∈ H,
• Xh = L+ × R
K
+ , and eh = (ωh, 0) ∈ L+ × R
K
+ ,
• uh is quasi-concave and monotone with respect to public goods, that is, for every
xh ∈ L+, G
′ ≥ G implies uh(xh, G
′) ≥ uh(xh, G),
• uh is σ × τRK -upper semicontinuous on L+ × R
K
+ .
A2: For each f ∈ F ,
• Yf ⊂ L× R
K
+ is convex and 0 ∈ Yf ,
• If (yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Yf , then (yf , 0) ∈ Yf .
A3: The set X̂ is (σ × τRK )
H -compact.
In A1, the first assumption on each Xh and eh is constitutive of the model. Monotonicity of
utilities with respect to public goods (“No public bads”) will play a decisive role in our proofs. In
A2, the first assumption on each Yf is constitutive of the model. Free disposal of public goods
is assumed in the second part of A2. If the dual pair 〈L,L′〉 is a symmetric Riesz dual system1
and if σ is the weak topology σ(L,L′) associated with the duality 〈L,L′〉, then Assumption A3 is
implied by the assumption that
(
Y +(ω, 0)
)
∩ (L+×R
K) is σ(L,L′)×τRK -compact. This is proved
in Proposition 4.1 of Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1987) for a private ownership economy
and easily adapted to our model of public good economy.
1That is 〈L,L′〉 is a dual pair of Riesz spaces and the order intervals of L are σ(L,L′)-compact.
53. Optimality, core and limit-core concepts
The purpose of this section is to give a series of definitions that adapt to the previous model the
standard optimality, core and limit-core concepts usually defined for a private ownership production
economy with only private goods.
Definition 3.1. A feasible consumption allocation (xh, x
g
h)h∈H ∈ X̂ is said to be weakly Pareto
optimal if there is no other feasible consumption allocation (xh, x
g
h)h∈H ∈ X̂ such that
uh(xh,
∑
h′∈H
xgh′) > uh(xh,
∑
h′∈H
xgh′) for each h ∈ H.
Definition 3.2. Let S ⊂ H, S 6= 6© be a coalition.
(1) (xh, x
g
h)h∈S ∈
∏
h∈S
Xh is a feasible choice assignment for the coalition S if∑
h∈S
(xh, x
g
h) ∈ {
∑
h∈S
eh}+
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F
θhfYf .
(2) The coalition S improves upon or blocks a feasible consumption allocation (xh, x
g
h)h∈H
in X̂ if there exists a feasible choice assignment (xh, x
g
h)h∈S ∈
∏
h∈S
Xh for the coalition S
such that
uh(xh,
∑
h′∈S
xgh′) > uh(xh,
∑
h′∈H
xgh′) for each h ∈ S.
Let G =
∑
h∈H x
g
h and G
S =
∑
h∈S x
g
h. G and G
S can be thought of as the respective amounts
of public goods entering as arguments in the utility function of each member of the coalition S
depending on his non-participation or his participation in the coalition. Thus, an interpretation
of the previous definition is the following: a coalition S blocks the feasible pair
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
if its members can consume some amount of private goods (xh)h∈S and claim some amount of
public goods GS that they unanimously prefer and can afford using their own resources. We will
alternatively say that the coalition S blocks or improves upon the feasible pair
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
with
the S-feasible pair
(
(xh)h∈S , G
S
)
.
Definition 3.3. The core C (E) of the economy E is defined as the set of all feasible consumption
allocations (alternatively, the set of all feasible pairs) of E that no coalition can improve upon.
We now continue with the replication concepts adapted to our model.
Definition 3.4. Let n be any positive integer. The n-fold replica of E is an economy composed
of n subeconomies identical to the original one
En =
(
〈L× RK , L′ × RK〉, (uh,s, eh,s) h∈H
s=1,...,n
, (Yf,t) f∈F
t=1,...,n
, (θh,s,f,t) h∈H,f∈F
s,t=1,...,n
)
with the following characteristics:
• The economy En has the same commodity-price duality 〈L× R
K , L′ × RK〉 as E .
• For each f ∈ F , n firms, each one indexed by (f, t) (t = 1, . . . , n), have the same production
set: Yf,t := Yf .
• For each h ∈ H, n households of type h, each one indexed by (h, s) (s = 1, . . . , n), have
the same choice set Xh,s := Xh = L+ × R
K
+ and the same initial endowment eh,s := eh =
(ωh, 0) ∈ L+ × {0}.
6• For ownership of initial holdings and production possibilities, each household (h, s) is a
copy of h, but restricted within his subeconomy:2 θh,s,f,t is defined by
θh,s,f,t = 0 if s 6= t and θh,s,f,t = θh,f if s = t.
• The definition of consumers’ preferences is specific of an economy with public goods. For
a consumer (h, s), the utility associated with a choice (xh,s, x
g
h,s) is the utility
uh
xh,s, 1
n
∑
(h′,s′)∈H×{1,...,n}
xgh′,s′

corresponding to the private commodity consumption xh,s and the mean of the aggregate
public good provision in the whole economy. Such a definition is quite similar to the one
proposed by Vasil’ev (1994-96), justified by the idea that for most of public goods, the
appreciation we have about their “size” is dependent on the size of the economy we are
talking about (see Milleron 1972). For the same consumer (h, s), considered as belonging
to a coalition T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n}, the utility associated with the same choice (xh,s, x
g
h,s)
is the mean of the aggregate public good provision in the coalition over the number of
consumers of type h in this coalition, that is
uh
xh,s, 1
|T (h)|
∑
(h′,s′)∈T
xgh′,s′

where T (h) := {s ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (h, s) ∈ T} and |T (h)| denotes the number of elements
of T (h). In other words, the appreciation of a consumer of type h about the provision of
public goods is now dependent on the size of the group of consumers of his type in the
coalition.
According to this definition, blocking in replica economies is defined as follows:
Definition 3.5. A coalition T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n} improves upon or blocks a feasible con-
sumption allocation ((xh,1, x
g
h,1)h∈H , . . . , (xh,n, x
g
h,n)h∈H) of En if there is some (yf,t, y
g
f,t) ∈ Yf
for each f ∈ F , t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and some (xh,s, x
g
h,s)(h,s)∈T ∈ L
T
+ × (R
K
+ )
T such that
(3.1)
∑
(h,s)∈T
(xh,s, x
g
h,s) =
∑
h∈H
|T (h)|(ωh, 0) +
∑
(h,s)∈T
∑
f∈F
θh,f (yf,s, y
g
f,s)
and
(3.2)
uh
xh,s, 1
|T (h)|
∑
(h′,s′)∈T
xgh′,s′
 > uh
xh,s, 1
n
∑
(h′,s′)∈H×{1,...,n}
xgh′,s′
 for each (h, s) ∈ T
In other words, a coalition T blocks the feasible (xh,s, x
g
h,s)(h,s)∈H×{1,...,n} if its members can
consume some amount of private goods (xh,s)(h,s)∈T and claim some weighted amount of public
goods that they unanimously prefer and can afford using their own resources.
In relation (3.1), define GT =
∑
(h,s)∈T x
g
h,s. It will be convenient to speak of the pair(
(xh,s)(h,s)∈T , G
T
)
as a T -feasible pair.
2This definition is coherent with the definitions given by Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1987) or Florenzano
(1990).
7Definition 3.6. The core C (En) is the set of all feasible allocations (alternatively, the set of all
feasible pairs) of En which are blocked by no coalition T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n}.
Finally, let (xh, x
g
h)h∈H be a feasible consumption allocation of E . Then, for any positive integer
n, we can define for each household (h, s) ∈ H × {1, ..., n}, xh,s = xh and x
g
h,s = x
g
h. It is easy to
see that the consumption allocation so obtained
((xh,1, x
g
h,1)h∈H , . . . , (xh,n, x
g
h,n)h∈H) = ((xh, x
g
h)h∈H , . . . , (xh, x
g
h)h∈H)
is a feasible consumption allocation of En, called n-equal treatment allocation in En because it gives
the same choice (xh, x
g
h) to each of the n consumers of type h.
Definition 3.7. For each integer n ≥ 1, Cn(E) is the set of all feasible consumption allocations of
E such that the corresponding n-equal treatment consumption allocation of En belongs to C (En).
We are now ready to give the definition of Edgeworth equilibria of E .
Definition 3.8. A feasible consumption allocation (xh, x
g
h)h∈H (alternatively, a feasible pair(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
where G =
∑
h∈H x
g
h) is said to be an Edgeworth equilibrium of E whenever the
corresponding n-equal treatment consumption allocation, that is, its n-replica, belongs to C (En)
for every n-fold replica economy En of E . We denote by C
E (E) the set of the Edgeworth equilibria
of E .
One easily verifies that for every n, Cn+1(E) ⊂ Cn(E) and thus that
CE (E) =
⋂
n≥1
Cn(E) ⊂ . . . ⊂ Cn+1(E) ⊂ Cn(E) ⊂ . . . ⊂ C(E).
The non-emptiness of CE (E) under the standard assumptions on E is proved in the next section.
4. Non-emptiness theorems
When preferences are represented by utility functions, existence of Edgeworth equilibria is based
on the celebrated Theorem 1 of Scarf (1967) on the non-emptiness of the core of a balanced
game. In an infinite dimensional setting, that is the strategy followed by Aliprantis, Brown and
Burkinshaw (1987) for a private ownership production economy, by Allouch and Florenzano (2004)
for an arbitrage-free exchange economy. We will adapt here Allouch–Florenzano’s strategy to our
production economy with private provisions of pure public goods. One can find in the PhD thesis
of del Mercato (2004), with a different notion of Edgeworth equilibrium and under the assumption
that the commodity-space duality 〈L,L′〉 is a symmetric Riesz dual system, an adaptation of
Aliprantis–Brown–Burkinshaw’s strategy to our public good economy. Monotonicity of utility
functions with respect to private and public goods plays a decisive role in this adaptation.
Actually, we will use an extension of Scarf’s theorem to finite fuzzy games. Before recalling
its statement, we need to introduce some notation. Let M = {1, . . . ,m} be a finite set of players
and T M = [0, 1]m \ {0}. An element t ∈ T M is interpreted as a fuzzy coalition, that is, a vector
t = (ti)
m
i=1 of rates of participation to the coalition t for the different players. We are interested in
finite subsets T of T M containing the vector 1 = (1, . . . , 1) of rates of participation to the grand
coalition and the canonical base (ei) of Rm, each ei being the vector of rates of participation to
the coalition {i}. A nonempty-valued correspondence V : T → Rm defines a fuzzy game (T , V ).
The fuzzy core C(T , V ) of the m-person fuzzy game (T , V ) is defined as the set
C(T , V ) := {v ∈ V (1) : 6 ∃t ∈ T and u ∈ V (t) s.t. vi < ui, ∀i : ti > 0}.
8Let
△T =
{
(λt)t∈T : λt ≥ 0 and
∑
t∈T
λtt = 1
}
.
The m-person fuzzy game (T , V ) is said to be balanced whenever for every λ ∈ △T ,⋂
{t∈T : λt>0}
V (t) ⊂ V (1).
The following theorem, proved in Allouch and Florenzano (2004), extends Scarf’s theorem as stated
by Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1989).
Theorem 4.1. If T is as above and if (T , V ) is a balanced m-person fuzzy game such that
(a) each V (t) is closed,
(b) each V (t) is comprehensive from below, i.e., u ≤ v and v ∈ V (t) imply u ∈ V (t),
(c) u ∈ Rm, v ∈ V (t) and ui = vi ∀i : ti > 0 imply u ∈ V (t),
(d) for each t ∈ T there exists ct ∈ R, such that v ∈ V (t) implies vi ≤ ct for all i : ti > 0,
then
C(T , V ) 6= 6© .
Coming back to our model, let
U =
{
v ∈ RH : ∃(xh, x
g
h)h∈H ∈ X̂ s.t. uh(ωh, 0) ≤ vh ≤ uh(xh,
∑
h′∈H
xgh′), ∀h ∈ H
}
.
Letting G =
∑
h∈H x
g
h, one can also write with some abuse of language:
U =
{
v ∈ RH : ∃
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
∈ X̂ s.t. uh(ωh, 0) ≤ vh ≤ uh(xh, G), ∀h ∈ H
}
.
Noticing that inaction is possible (Assumptions A1 and A2), this set can be thought of as the set
of vectors of feasible and individually rational utilities.
To each coalition T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n} of the n-replica economy En of E is associated a vector of
rates of participation belonging to the set
Tn = {t = (th)h∈H : nth ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n},∀h ∈ H} .
We will denote by 1 the vector of rates of participation to the grand coalition H. The h-th vector of
the canonical base of RH , eh, is the vector of rates of participation to the coalition {h} containing
the only one participant h.
For each t ∈ Tn , letting supp t = {h ∈ H : th > 0}, we define successively:
X̂t =
((xth)h∈supp t, Gt) ∈ Lsupp t+ × RK+ : (∑
h∈H
thx
t
h, G
t
)
∈
∑
h∈H
th(ωh, 0) +
∑
h∈H
th
∑
f∈F
θh,fYf
 ;
Ut =
{
(vh) ∈ R
supp t : ∃
(
(xth)h∈supp t, G
t
)
∈ X̂t s.t. uh(ωh, 0) ≤ vh ≤ uh(x
t
h,
Gt
th
), ∀h ∈ supp t
}
;
V (t) = cl
(
Ut − R
supp t
+
)
× RH\supp t.
It easily follows from AssumptionsA1 andA3 that U is compact. Also, each X̂eh ⊂ X̂h is relatively
(σ × τRK )
H -compact, so that it also follows from Assumption A1 that Ueh is relatively compact.
9Thus there exists c > maxh∈H uh(ωh, 0) such that U ⊂ ] −∞, c [
H and Ueh ⊂ ] −∞, c [, for each
h ∈ H. We now define
V c(t) =
(
cl
(
Ut − R
supp t
+
)⋂(
]−∞, c]
)supp t)
× RH\supp t.
We will apply Theorem 4.1 to the fuzzy game (Tn , V
c).
Proposition 4.1. Under the standard assumptions on E, for every integer n ≥ 1 the fuzzy core
C(Tn, V
c) is non-empty. Consequently, C(Tn, V ) 6= 6©.
Proof. By construction, the fuzzy game (Tn, V
c) verifies the conditions a, b, c, d of Theorem 4.1.
It suffices to verify that the fuzzy game (Tn, V
c) is balanced. To this end, let λ ∈ △Tnand
v ∈
⋂
{t∈Tn : λt>0}
V c(t). For each integer ν and for every t ∈ Tn such that λt > 0, there exists(
(xt,νh )h∈supp t, G
t,ν
)
∈ X̂t such that for every h ∈ supp t,
uh(x
t,ν
h ,
Gt,ν
th
) ≥ uh(ωh, 0) and vh ≤ uh(x
t,ν
h ,
Gt,ν
th
) +
1
ν
.
For each h ∈ H, let
xνh =
∑
t∈Tn
λtthx
t,ν
h .
Let also Gν =
∑
t∈Tn
λtG
t,ν . Using the definition of △Tn and the convexity of each production set
Yf , one has:
(
∑
h∈H
xνh, G
ν) = (
∑
h∈H
∑
t∈Tn
λtthx
t,ν
h ,
∑
t∈Tn
λtG
t,ν)
= (
∑
t∈Tn
λt
∑
h∈H
thx
t,ν
h ,
∑
t∈Tn
λtG
t,ν)
∈ (
∑
t∈Tn
λt
∑
h∈H
thωh , 0) +
∑
t∈Tn
λt
∑
h∈H
th
∑
f∈F
θh,fYf
∈
∑
h∈H
(ωh, 0) +
∑
f∈F
∑
h∈H
θh,f
∑
t∈Tn
λtthYf
∈
∑
h∈H
(ωh, 0) +
∑
f∈F
∑
h∈H
θh,fYf ,
which proves that
(
(xνh)h∈H , G
ν
)
∈ X̂.
On the other hand, notice that for each h ∈ H,
Gν =
∑
t∈Tn
λtG
t,ν =
∑
t∈Tn
th 6=0
λtG
t,ν +
∑
t∈Tn
th=0
λtG
t,ν .
It then follows from the monotonicity with respects to public goods and the quasiconcavity of each
uh and the definition of △
Tn that uh(x
ν
h, G
ν) ≥ uh(ωh, 0) and vh ≤ uh(x
ν
h, G
ν) + 1ν , which shows
that
(
uh(x
ν
h, G
ν)
)
h∈H
∈ U . Recalling that U is compact and passing to a subsequence if necessary,
we get that for some
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
∈ X̂ and for each h ∈ H,
vh ≤ lim
ν→+∞
uh(x
ν
h, G
ν) ≤ uh(xh, G).
Hence v = (vh)h∈H ∈ V (1) = V
c(1), which shows that the fuzzy game (Tn, V
c) is balanced and
that C(Tn, V
c) 6= 6©.
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To prove the last assertion, let v = (vh)h∈H ∈ C(Tn, V
c). Note that v ∈ V c(1) = V (1) = U−RH+ .
Moreover v ∈ U . Indeed, if not, for some h0 ∈ H, uh0(ωh0 , 0) > vh0 and
(
uh(ωh, 0)
)
h∈H
∈ V (eh0) =
V c(eh0), in contradiction with v ∈ C(Tn, V
c). We now prove by contraposition that v ∈ C(Tn, V ).
Let us assume on the contrary that there exist t ∈ Tn and u ∈ V (t) such that vh < uh, ∀h ∈ supp t.
We have vh < uh ∀h ∈ supp t and uh(ωh, 0) ≤ vh < c ∀h ∈ H. Let λ > 0 be such that
vh < vh + λ(c− uh(ωh, 0) < min{uh, c} ∀h ∈ supp t. Then
(
vh + λ(c− uh(ωh, 0)
)
h∈H
∈ V c(t), in
contradiction with v ∈ C(Tn, V
c).
Proposition 4.2. Under the standard assumptions on E,
⋂
n≥1
C(Tn, V ) 6= 6©.
Proof. Let us first show that C(Tn, V ) is closed. Let v = limν→ +∞ v
ν with vν ∈ C(Tn, V ). If
v /∈ C(Tn, V ), then there exist t ∈ Tn and u ∈ V (t) such that vh < uh ∀h ∈ supp t. For ν large
enough, vνh < uh ∀h ∈ supp t, a contradiction. To end the proof, in view of the compactness of
U , it suffices to prove that for each integer n ≥ 1, C(Tn+1, V ) ⊂ C(Tn, V ). Let v ∈ C(Tn+1, V ).
If v /∈ C(Tn, V ), there exist t ∈ Tn and u ∈ V (t) such that vh < uh ∀h ∈ supp t. Let us consider
t′ = nn+1 t. If
(
(xth)h∈supp t, G
t
)
∈ X̂t and if x
t′
h = x
t
h, G
t′ = nn+1G
t, then
(
(xt
′
h )h∈supp t, G
t′
)
∈ X̂t′ .
Conversely, if
(
(xt
′
h )h∈supp t, G
t′
)
∈ X̂t′ and if x
t
h = x
t′
h , G
t = n+1n G
t′ , then
(
(xth)h∈supp t, G
t
)
∈ X̂t.
Now, clearly, Ut′ = Ut and V (t
′) = V (t). Since t′ ∈ Tn+1 and u ∈ V (t
′), we have got a contradiction.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.2. Under the standard assumptions on E, the set CE(E) of Edgeworth equilibria of E
is non-empty.
Proof. Let v ∈
⋂
n≥1
C(Tn, V ). As already noticed, v ∈ U and there exists
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
∈ X̂ such
that for each h ∈ H, uh(ωh, 0) ≤ vh ≤ uh(xh, G). We claim that
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
∈ CE(E). Assume on
the contrary, that for some n ≥ 1,
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
/∈ Cn(E). Coming back to Definitions 3.5 and 3.7,
there exist T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n} and (xh,s, x
g
h,s)(h,s)∈T satisfying relations (3.1) and (3.2). Let
GT =
∑
(h,s)∈T xh,s be the aggregate amount of provisions of public goods by the members of T and
Gt = 1nG
T . Letting for each h : T (h) 6= 6© and for each f ∈ F , th =
|T (h)|
n , x
t
h =
1
|T (h)|
∑
s∈T (h) xh,s,
(ytf , y
g,t
f ) =
1
|T (h)|
∑
s∈T (h)(yf,s, y
g
f,s), relations (3.1) and (3.2) can easily be rewritten:
(4.1)
(∑
h∈H
thx
t
h, G
t
)
=
∑
h∈H
th(ωh, 0) +
∑
h∈H
th
∑
f∈F
θh,f (y
t
f , y
g,t
f )
where, in view of the convexity of Yf , each (yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Yf , and, using the quasi-concavity of each
uh,
(4.2) uh
(
xth,
1
th
Gt
)
> uh(xh, G).
Relations (4.1) and (4.2) show that v /∈ C(Tn, V ), a contradiction.
Remark 4.3. It is worth noticing that, at this stage, the private provisions which sum to G in the
pair
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
do not need to be precise. In the next section, we will determine the private
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provisions which sum to G when the Edgeworth equilibrium pair
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
is decentralized as
the consumption component of a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium.
5. Decentralizing Edgeworth equilibria as Lindahl–Foley equilibria
Let us first introduce the following equilibrium definition.
Definition 5.1. A Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of E is a t-uple(
(xh)h∈H , (th)h∈H , G, (yf , y
g
f )f∈F , (p, p
g)
)
∈ (L+)
H × [0, 1]H × RK+ ×
∏
f∈F
Yf × (L
′ × RK)
such that:
(1) for every f ∈ F , for every (yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Yf , (p, p
g) · (yf , y
g
f ) ≤ (p, p
g) · (yf , y
g
f ),
(2) for every h ∈ H, (xh, G) maximizes uh(xh, G) in the budget set
Bh(th, (p, pg)) =
{
(xh, G) ∈ L+ × R
K
+ : p · xh + thp
g ·G ≤ p · ωh +
∑
f∈F
θh,f (p, p
g) · (yf , y
g
f )
}
,
(3) G =
∑
f∈F y
g
f ;
∑
h∈H th = 1;
∑
h∈H xh =
∑
h∈H ωh +
∑
f∈F yf .
If, in the previous definition, we set xgh = thG, then each x
g
h can be thought of as h’s provision
of public goods and condition 3 in the previous definition means that the allocation(
(xh, x
g
h)h∈H , (yf , y
g
f )f∈F
)
is a feasible allocation of E . One can also say that
(
(xh)h∈H , G, (yf , y
g
f )f∈F
)
is a feasible Lindahl–
Foley allocation and that the pair
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
is a feasible Lindahl–Foley consumption
allocation.
If we set pgh = thp
g, each pgh can be thought of as a personalized vector of public good
prices as in the classical definition (See for example Milleron 1972, Section 3) of Lindahl–Foley
equilibrium. Then in both cases, Condition 1 means that each firm maximizes its profit taking
as given the common vector price (p, pg). Condition 2 means that each consumer chooses a con-
sumption of private goods and claims a total amount of public goods, so as to maximize his utility
function taking as given the common price of private goods and his personalized price of public
goods (equivalently, the relative part of public goods he accepts to provide). Equilibrium is char-
acterized by feasibility of the allocation and a unanimous consent on the amount of public goods
to be produced.
It is worth noticing that the equilibrium definition 5.1 dramatically differs by the setting of
household h’s optimization problem from the more classical general equilibrium concept studied
in Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2001) where, for a common vector price (p, pg), each household is
assumed to choose his provision of public goods so as to maximize his utility function, taking as
given the provisions of public goods of the other agents.3 In contrast with results of Villanacci
and Zenginobuz (2003), it simply follows from the definitions that a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of
E is Pareto optimal, belongs to the core and is an Edgeworth equilibrium, for the optimality and
core notions defined in Section 3. The purpose of this section is to prove converse results. More
3Identifying consumption and provision of public goods, a careful reader will notice that the Villanacci–
Zenginobuz equilibrium can be analyzed as a general equilibrium of a production economy where, as in Florenzano
(1990), preferences of the agents depend on the consumptions of the other agents.
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precisely, it is to associate with an Edgeworth equilibrium of E private good prices and personalized
public good prices so as to get a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium.
5.1. Definition of an associated economy E ′ with only private commodities. Following
Foley (1970) and Milleron (1972), we now define an economy E ′ with only private commodities
such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the feasible allocations in this economy
and the feasible Lindahl–Foley allocations in the original model E .
We first extend the commodity space by considering each consumer’s bundle of public goods as
a separate group of commodities. The consumption set of consumer h is then extended by writing
for all public good components not corresponding to the hth component hypothetic bundles of
public goods Gh′,h which do not enter as arguments in the utility function of h:
X ′h =
{
x′h ∈ L+ × (R
K
+ )
H : x′h =
(
xh, (G1,h, . . . , GH,h)
)}
,
Production sets, initial endowments and utility functions are defined as follows:
Y ′f =
{
y′f ∈ L× (R
K)H : ∃(yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Yf , y
′
f =
(
yf , (y
g
1,f , . . . , y
g
H,f
)
, yh,f ≤ y
g
f ∀h ∈ H
}
;
e′h =
(
ωh, (0, . . . , 0)
)
; u′h(x
′
h) = uh(xh, Gh,h).
Finally,
E ′ =
(
〈L× (RK)H , L′ × (RK)H〉, (X ′h, u
′
h, e
′
h)h∈H , (Y
′
f )f∈F , (θh,f )h∈H
f∈F
)
.
The relations between weakly Pareto optimal, core and Edgeworth (feasible) Lindahl–Foley allo-
cations of E as defined in Section 3 on one hand, and on the other hand, weakly Pareto optimal,
core and Edgeworth equilibrium allocations of E ′, as usually defined, are summarized in the next
proposition. Its proof is straightforward, if one cautiously overcomes notational difficulties. The
results strongly rely on the assumption of monotonicity of utility functions with respect to public
goods.
Proposition 5.1. Under the standard assumptions on E, we have the following:
(a) Let 6© 6= S ⊂ H be a coalition. If
(
(xh)h∈S , G
S
)
is S-feasible in E, the consumption
assignment (x′h)h∈S where for each h ∈ S, x
′
h =
(
xh, (0, . . . , G
S , . . . , 0)
)
, that we will call
in the sequel the corresponding (x′h)h∈S, is S-feasible in E
′. Conversely, if some (x′h)h∈S
is S-feasible in E ′, with x′h =
(
xh, (G1,h, . . . , GH,h)
)
∈ X ′h for each h ∈ S, then there exists
GS ∈ RK+ such that
(
(xh)h∈S , G
S
)
is S-feasible in E. Moreover, GS ≥ Gh,h ∀h ∈ S.
(b) In particular, if
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
is Lindahl–Foley feasible in E, the corresponding (x′h)h∈H
is feasible in E ′. Conversely, if (x′h)h∈H is feasible in E
′, with for each h ∈ H, x′h =(
xh, (G1,h, . . . , GH,h)
)
∈ X ′h, then there exists G such that
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
is Lindahl–Foley
feasible in E.
(c) If
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
is weakly Pareto optimal in E, the corresponding (x′h)h∈H is a weak Pareto
optimum in E ′.
(d) If
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
∈ C(E), the corresponding (x′h)h∈H belongs to the core C(E
′).
(e) Let 6© 6= T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n}. If the pair
(
(xh,s)(h,s)∈T , G
T )) is T -feasible in En, then the
assignment (x′h,s)(h,s)∈T where for each (h, s) ∈ T , x
′
h,s =
(
xh,s, (0, . . . ,
1
|T (h)|G
T , . . . , 0)
)
is T -feasible in E ′n.
Conversely, if (x′h,s)(h,s)∈T is T -feasible in E
′
n, with for each (h, s) ∈ T ,
x′h,s =
(
xh,s, (G1,h,s, . . . , Gh,h,s, . . . , GH,h,s)
)
∈ X ′h,s = X
′
h,
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then there exists GT such that
(
(xh,s)(h,s)∈T , G
T ) is T -feasible in En. Moreover, G
T ≥∑
s∈T (h) Gh,h,s, ∀h : T (h) 6= 6©.
(f) Let
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
be Lindahl–Foley feasible in E and (x′h)h∈H be the corresponding feasible
allocation in E ′. If a coalition T blocks in E ′n the n-replica of (x
′
h)h∈H , then T blocks in En
the n-replica of
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
. Consequently, if
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
∈ CE(E), the corresponding
(x′h)h∈H is an Edgeworth equilibrium of E
′.
Proof. To prove a., let us assume that for some S ⊂ H and for some (yf , y
g
f )f∈F ∈
∏
f∈F Yf , one
has ∑
h∈S
xh =
∑
h∈S
ωh +
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F
θh,fyf
and
GS =
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F
θh,fy
g
f .
Then, ∑
h∈S
x′h =
∑
h∈S
(
(xh, (0, . . . , G
S , . . . 0)
)
=
(∑
h∈S
xh, (G
S)h′∈S , (0)h′ /∈S
)
=
∑
h∈S
(
ωh, (0, . . . , 0)
)
+
(∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F
θh,fyf ,
(
(
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F
θh,fy
g
f )h′∈S , (0)h′ /∈S
))
∈
∑
h∈S
e′h +
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F
θh,fY
′
f ,
by definition of Y ′f .
Assume conversely that for some S ⊂ H and for some (yf , y
g
f )f∈F ∈
∏
f∈F Yf , one has∑
h∈S
x′h =
∑
h∈S
(
xh, (G1,h, . . . , Gh,h . . . , GH,h)
)
=
∑
h∈S
(
ωh, (0, . . . , 0)
)
+
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F
θh,fy
′
f
with y′f = (yf , y
g
1,f , . . . , y
g
H,f ), y
g
h,f ≤ y
g
f for each h ∈ H. Setting G
S =
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F θh,fy
g
f , one
sees that the consumption pair
(
(xh)h∈S , G
S
)
is S-feasible in E . Moreover, since for every h′ ∈ H,∑
h∈S
Gh′,h =
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F
θh,fy
g
h′,f ≤
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F
θh,fy
g
f = G
S ,
one has a fortiori for every h′ ∈ S, Gh′,h′ ≤ G
S .
To prove c. and d., consider a feasible allocation
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
in E and the corresponding
allocation (x′h)h∈H in E
′. It suffices to prove that if some coalition S blocks (x′h)h∈H in E
′ then the
same coalition blocks
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
in E . Indeed, assume that some (x′h)h∈S ∈
∏
h∈S X
′
h satisfies
for some (yf , y
g
f )f∈F ∈
∏
f∈F Yf ,∑
h∈S
(
xh, (G1,h, . . . , Gh,h, . . . , GH,h)
)
=
∑
h∈S
(
ωh, (0, . . . 0)
)
+
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F
θh,f
(
yf , (y
g
1,f , . . . , y
g
H,f )
)
with for each h ∈ H ygh,f ≤ y
g
f , and for each h ∈ S,
uh(xh, Gh,h) = u
′(x′h) > u
′
h(x
′
h) = uh(xh, G).
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Letting GS =
∑
h∈S
∑
f∈F θh,fy
g
f , it follows from a. that
(
(xh)h∈S , G
S
)
is S-feasible in E . It also
follows from a. and the monotonicity of the uh with respect to public goods that for each h ∈ S,
uh(xh, G
S) > uh(xh, G).
To prove e., according to the definition of replica economies of private ownership production
economies with private goods,4 recall first that in E ′n,
X ′h,s = X
′
h =
{
x′h,s ∈ L+ × (R
K
+ )
H : x′h,s =
(
xh,s, (G1,h,s, . . . , Gh,h,s, . . . , GH,h,s
)}
;
Y ′f,t = Y
′
f =
y′f,t ∈ L× (RK)H : ∃(yf,t, ygf,t) ∈ Yf ,
y′f,t =
(
yf,t, (y
g
1,f,t, . . . , y
g
H,f,t)
)
, yh,f,t ≤ y
g
f,t ∀h ∈ H
 ;
e′h,s = e
′
h =
(
ωh , (0, . . . , 0)
)
;
θh,s,f,t = 0 if s 6= t and θh,s,f,t = θh,f if s = t.
Assume that
(
(xh,s)(h,s)∈T , G
T
)
is a T -feasible pair satisfying (3.1) and (3.2) of Definition 3.5.
Then, letting for each (h, s) ∈ T , x′h,s =
(
xh,s, (0, . . . ,
1
|T (h)|G
T , . . . 0)
)
, one has:∑
(h,s)∈T
x′h,s =
( ∑
(h,s)∈T
xh,s,
(
(GT )
{h′ : T (h′) 6=6©}, (0){h′ : T (h′)= 6©}
))
=
∑
h∈H
|T (h)|
(
ωh, (0, . . . , 0)
)
+
∑
(h,s)∈T
∑
f∈F
θh,f
(
yf,s,
(
(ygf,s){h′ : T (h′) 6= 6©}, (0){h′ : T (h′)= 6©}
))
∈
∑
h∈H
|T (h)|
(
ωh , (0, . . . , 0)
)
+
∑
(h,s)∈T
∑
f∈F
θh,fY
′
f,s
by definition of Y ′f,s.
Conversely, assume that
(x′h,s)(h,s)∈T =
(
xh,s, (G1,h,s, . . . , Gh,h,s, . . . , GH,h,s
)
(h,s)∈T
∈
∏
(h,s)∈T
X ′h,s
is T -feasible in E ′n, that is,∑
(h,s)∈T
x′h,s =
∑
h∈H
|T (h)|(ωh , (0, . . . , 0)
)
+
∑
(h,s)∈T
∑
f∈F
θh,fy
′
f,s
with for each (f, s), for each h ∈ H,
y′f,s =
(
yf,s, (y
g
1,f,s, . . . , y
g
H,f,s)
)
, ygh,f,s ≤ y
g
f,s, (yf,s, y
g
f,s) ∈ Yf .
For each h′ and each h : T (h) 6= 6© one has∑
s∈T (h)
Gh′,h,s ≤
∑
(h,s)∈T
Gh′,h,s =
∑
(h,s)∈T
∑
f∈F
θh,fyh′,f,s ≤
∑
(h,s)∈T
∑
f∈F
θh,fyf,s.
Define GT =
∑
(h,s)∈T
∑
f∈F θh,fyf,s. The pair
(
(xh,s)(h,s)∈T , G
T
)
is T -feasible in En. Moreover,
for each h : T (h) 6= 6©,
∑
s∈T (h) Gh,h,s ≤ G
T .
To prove f., consider now a feasible allocation
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
in E , the corresponding allocation
(x′h)h∈H in E
′ and assume that the coalition T ⊂ H × {1, . . . , n} blocks the n-replica of (x′h)h∈H
with some (x′h,s)(h,s)∈T ∈
∏
(h,s)∈T X
′
h,s. With the previous definitions and notations, the pair
4See, for example, Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1987).
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(
(xh,s)(h,s)∈T , G
T
)
is T -feasible.
On the other hand, one has for each (h, s) ∈ T , uh(xh,s, Gh,h,s) > uh(xh, G). It follows from the
quasiconcavity of utility functions that for each h : T (h) 6= 6©,
uh(
1
|T (h)|
∑
s∈T (h)
xh,s ,
1
|T (h)|
∑
s∈T (h)
Gh,h,s) > uh(xh, G)
and from e. and the monotonicity of uh with respect to public goods that
uh(
1
|T (h)|
∑
s∈T (h)
xh,s ,
1
|T (h)|
GT ) > uh(xh, G).
For h : T (h) 6= 6©, set x˜h =
1
|T (h)|
∑
{s∈T (h)} xh,s. This proves that the coalition T blocks in En
the n-replica of
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
with the T -feasible pair
(
(x˜h)(h,s)∈T , G
T
)
. The last assertion of f. is
now obvious.
In the sequel, we start with an Edgeworth equilibrium
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
as obtained in Theorem 4.2
and show how to decentralize it as a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of E with prices in L′ × (RK)H .
More precisely, let for each f ∈ F , (yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Yf be such that
(5.1)
∑
h∈H
xh =
∑
h∈H
ωh +
∑
f∈F
yf
and
(5.2) G =
∑
f∈F
ygf .
With the allocation
((
(xh)h∈H , G
)
, (yf , y
g
f )f∈F
)
, we will associate a nonzero price vector(
p, (pgh)h∈H
)
∈ L′ × (RK+ )
H
such that for each h ∈ H, for each (xh, G) ∈ L+×R
K
+ , for each f ∈ F , and for every (yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Yf ,
(5.3) p · xh + p
g
h ·G = p · ωh +
∑
f∈F
θh,f
(
p · yf + (
∑
h∈H
pgh) · y
g
f
)
,
(5.4) uh(xh, G) > uh(xh, G) =⇒ p · xh + p
g
h ·G ≥ p · xh + p
g
h ·G,
(5.5) p · yf + (
∑
h∈H
pgh)y
g
f ≤ p · yf + (
∑
h∈H
pgh)y
g
f .
Such a
((
(xh)h∈H , G
)
, (yf , y
g
f )f∈F ,
(
p, (pgh)h∈H
))
will be called Lindahl-Foley quasiequilib-
rium. If for some h ∈ H, uh(xh, G) > uh(xh, G) actually implies p · xh + p
g
h ·G > p · xh + p
g
h ·G,
this quasiequilibrium will be called non-trivial.
From now on, we set on E the following additional assumptions:
A4: If
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
is a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E , each utility function
uh is lower semicontinuous at (xh, G).
A5: If
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
is a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E , then for each h ∈ H
there exists x′h ∈ L+ such that uh
(
xh+λ(x
′
h−xh), G
)
> uh(xh, G) for every λ : 0 < λ ≤ 1.
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A.6: If
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
is a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E , then there exists
h ∈ H and Gh ∈ R
K
+ such that uh(xh, Gh) > uh(xh, G).
5.2. Decentralization in a finite dimensional setting. In this subsection, L is some finite
dimensional Euclidean space equipped with its Euclidean topology τ . Its topological dual L′ is as
usual identified with L.
Proposition 5.2. Let
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
be an Edgeworth equilibrium consumption allocation and let
(yf , y
g
f )f∈F be the production allocation satisfying (5.1) and (5.2).
(a) There exists
(
p, (pgh)h∈H
)
∈ L′×(RK+ )
H such that
((
(xh)h∈H , G
)
, (yf , y
g
f )f∈F ,
(
p, (pgh)h∈H
))
is a Lindahl–Foley quasiequilibrium.
(b) The quasiequilibrium is nontrivial provided that (ω, 0) ∈ int
(
(L+×R
K
+ )−Y
)
). In this case,
p 6= 0.
(c) If the quasiequilibrium is an equilibrium, then (pgh)h∈H 6= 0 and consequently
∑
h∈H p
g
h 6= 0.
Proof. As shown in Proposition 5.1, the allocation (x′h)h∈H =
(
xh, (0, . . . , G, . . . , 0)
)
h∈H
satisfies∑
h∈H
(
(xh, (0, . . . , G, . . . 0)
)
=
∑
h∈H
x′h =
∑
h∈H
e′h +
∑
f∈F
y′f
=
∑
h∈H
(
ωh, (0, . . . , 0)
)
+
(∑
f∈F
yf ,
(∑
f∈F
ygf , . . . ,
∑
f∈F
ygf , . . . ,
∑
f∈F
ygf
))
and is an Edgeworth equilibrium consumption allocation of E ′ that we will decentralize with a
nonzero price as a quasiequilibrium allocation of E ′.
From Assumptions A4 and A5, we easily deduce local non-satiation of preferences in E ′ at each
component
(
xh, (0, . . . , G, . . . , 0)
)
and openness in each X ′h = L+ × (R
K
+ )
H of preferred sets
Ph(
(
xh, (0, . . . , G, . . . , 0)
)
=
{
x′h =
(
xh , (G1,h, . . . , GH,h)
)
∈ X ′h : uh(xh, Gh,h) > uh(xh, G)
}
for the topology τ × τRK × . . .× τRK . It then follows from the classical result of decentralization in
private ownership economies with private goods that there exists pi =
(
p, (pg1, . . . , p
g
H)
)
6= 0 such
that
(5.6) for each h ∈ H, pi · x′h = pi · e
′
h +
∑
f∈F
θh,fpi · y
′
f ,
(5.7) [x′h ∈ X
′
h and uh(xh, Gh,h) > uh(xh, G)] =⇒ pi · x
′
h ≥ pi · e
′
h +
∑
f∈F
θh,fpi · y
′
f ,
(5.8) for each f ∈ F and for every y′f ∈ Y
′
f , pi · y
′
f ≤ pi · y
′
f .
In other words,
(
(x′h)h∈H , (y
′
f )f∈F , pi
)
is a quasiequilibrium of E ′ with a nonzero quasiequilibrium
price.
The previous relations imply:
(5.9) for each h ∈ H, p · xh + p
g
h ·G = p · ωh +
∑
f∈F
θh,f
(
p · yf + (
∑
h∈H
pgh) · y
g
f
)
,
(5.10) [(xh, G) ∈ L+ × R
K
+ and uh(xh, G) > uh(xh, G)] =⇒ p · xh + p
g
h ·G ≥ p · xh + p
g
h ·G,
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(5.11) [(yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Yf and y
g
h,f ≤ y
g
f ∀h ∈ H] =⇒ p · yf +
∑
h∈H
pgh · y
g
h,f ≤ p · yf + (
∑
h∈H
pgh) · y
g
f .
In particular, for each f ∈ F and for every (yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Yf ,
(5.12) p · yf + (
∑
h∈H
pgh)y
g
f ≤ p · yf + (
∑
h∈H
pgh)y
g
f .
From (5.11), we deduce that for each h ∈ H, pgh ≥ 0, and the proof of a. is complete.
To prove b., assume that (ω, 0) ∈ int
(
(L+ × R
K
+ )− Y
)
). Since
(
p, (pgh)h∈H
)
6= 0, there is some
(u, v) ∈ L×RK such that
(
p,
∑
h∈H p
g
h
)
· (u, v) < 0 and (ω, 0) + (u, v) ∈ (L+ ×R
K
+ )− Y . Let δ =(
p,
∑
h∈H p
g
h
)
· (u, v). One can write for some (xh)h∈H ∈ (L+)
H , G ∈ RK+ , (yf , y
g
f )f∈F ∈
∏
f∈F Yf
(ω, 0) + (u, v) =
(∑
h∈H
xh, G
)
−
∑
f∈F
(yf , y
g
f ).
One deduces:
p ·
∑
h∈H
xh +
(∑
h∈H
pgh
)
·G−
∑
f∈F
(
p,
∑
h∈H
pgh
)
· (yf , y
g
f ) = p · ω + δ
that is ∑
h∈H
(
p · xh + p
g
h ·G
)
< p ·
∑
h∈H
ωh +
∑
f∈F
(
p,
∑
h∈H
pgh
)
· (yf , y
g
f )
≤ p ·
∑
h∈H
ωh +
∑
f∈F
(
p,
∑
h∈H
pgh
)
· (yf , y
g
f ) =
∑
h∈H
(
p · xh + p
g
h ·G
)
,
the last equality being a consequence of the feasibility of the Edgeworth equilibrium consumption
allocation
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
.
It thus follows that for some h ∈ H, p · xh + p
g
h · G < p · xh + p
g
h · G. Some consumer h ∈ H
can satisfy his budget constraint with a strict inequality. As usual, since in view of Assumption
A4 the utility function uh is lower semicontinuous at (xh, G), consumer h is utility maximizing at
this point under his budget constraint, and the quasiequilibrium is non-trivial.
Since the quasiequilibrium is non-trivial, using (5.10), it follows from Assumption A5 that for
some h ∈ H and for some xh ∈ L+
p · xh > p · xh,
which proves that p 6= 0.
To prove c., assume finally that the quasiequilibrium is an equilibrium. Using (5.10), it then
follows from Assumption A.6 that for some h ∈ H and for some Gh ∈ R
K
+ ,
pgh ·Gh > p
g
h ·G,
which proves that pgh 6= 0.
Remark 5.2. The condition for non-triviality
NT: (ω, 0) ∈ int
(
(L+ × R
K
+ )− Y
)
is satisfied for example under the following mild conditions that the total initial endowment in
private goods be strictly positive and that each public good be producible:
• ω ≫ 0;
• there exists some (y, yg) ∈ Y with yg ≫ 0.
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Remark 5.3. Several irreducibility conditions guarantee that a non-trivial quasiequilibrium is an
equilibrium.
A very simple condition, inspired by Arrow and Hahn (1971), is the following:
IR: For any non-trivial partition {H1,H2} of the set H of consumers and for any feasible
allocation
((
(xh)h∈H , G
)
,
(
yf , y
g
f
)
f∈F
)
of E , there exist
(
(x˜h)h∈H , G˜
)
∈ (L+)
H × RK+ and
ω′ ∈ L+ such that
• uh(x˜h, G˜) ≥ uh(xh, G) ∀h ∈ H1, with a strict inequality for at least one h of H1;
•
(∑
h∈H x˜h, G˜
)
∈ {ω′}+
∑
f∈F Yf with, for each coordinate i, ω
′i > ωi =⇒
∑
h∈H2
ωih >
0.
We leave the reader to verify that the non-trivial quasiequilibrium is then an equilibrium.
The obvious interpretation of this condition is that for any partition {H1,H2} of the set of
consumers into two nonempty subgroups and for each feasible allocation the group H1 may be
moved to a preferred position, feasible with a new vector of total resources in private goods, by
increasing the total resources of commodities which can be supplied in positive amount by the
group H2.
Non-triviality and irreducibility conditions are adapted from similar conditions in Chapter 2 of
Florenzano (2003).
A by-product of Proposition 5.2 is the following Lindahl–Foley equilibrium existence theorem:
Theorem 5.4. Under the assumptions A1–A6, NT, and IR, the economy E has a Lindahl–Foley
equilibrium
((
(xh)h∈H , G
)
, (yf , y
g
f )f∈F ,
(
p, (pgh)h∈H
))
with a private goods price vector p 6= 0 and
positive personalized price vectors for public goods, pgh ∈ R
K
+ , h ∈ H, not all equal to zero.
5.3. Decentralization in an infinite dimensional setting. In this subsection, as usual since
Mas-Colell and Richard (1991) in an infinite dimensional setting, we make on the dual pair 〈L,L′〉
the following structural assumption:
SA: L is a linear vector lattice (or Riesz space) equipped with a Hausdorff locally convex
linear topology τ such that
• The positive cone L+ is closed for the τ -topology of L;
• L′ = (L, τ)′, the topological dual of L for the topology τ (i.e. τ is compatible with
the duality 〈L,L′〉) and L′ is a vector sublattice of the order dual L∼ of L.5
It is worth noticing that it follows from Assumption SA that the commodity-price duality 〈L ×
(RK)H , L′× (RK)H〉 of the enlarged economy E ′ associated to E satisfies the same type of assump-
tion.
The decentralization with prices of an Edgeworth equilibrium of E will be obtained under the
following properness assumptions adapted from Tourky (1998, 1999).
A7: If
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
is a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E , then for each h ∈ H
there exists a convex set P̂h(xh, G) ⊂ L× R
K such that
• P̂h(xh, G) ∩ (L+ × R
K
+ ) = {(x˜h, G˜) ∈ (L+ × R
K
+ ) : uh(x˜h, G˜) > uh(xh, G)};
• (xh, G) + (ω, 0) is a τ -interior point of P̂h(xh, G).
5L∼ is by definition the vector space of all linear functionals f on L such that the image by f of any order
interval of L is an order bounded subset of R.
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When Assumption A7 is satisfied, we say that preferences are (ω, 0)-proper at every component
of a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E .
A8: If
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
is a H-feasible and individually rational pair in E and if (
∑
h∈H(xh −
ωh), G) =
∑
f∈F (yf , y
g
f ), then for each f ∈ F there exist a convex set Ŷf (yf ) ⊂ L × R
K
and a lattice Zyf ⊂ L× R
K such that
• Ŷf (yf ) ∩ Zyf = Yf ;
• (yf , y
g
f )− (ω, 0) is a τ -interior point of Ŷf (yf );
• (0, 0) ∈ Zyf , and Zyf − (L+ × R
K
+ ) ⊂ Zyf .
When Assumption A8 is satisfied, we say that each production set is (ω, 0)-proper at the corre-
sponding component of anyH-feasible and individually rational allocation
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
, (yf , y
g
f )f∈F
)
.
Proposition 5.3. Assume SA, A4–A8 and that ω > 0. Let
(
(xh)h∈H , G
)
be an Edgeworth
equilibrium consumption allocation and let (yf , y
g
f )f∈F be the production allocation satisfying (5.1)
and (5.2). Then,
(a) There exists
(
p, (pgh)h∈H
)
∈ L′ × (RK+ )
H such that p · ω > 0 and((
(xh)h∈H , G
)
, (yf , y
g
f )f∈F ,
(
p, (pgh)h∈H
))
is a Lindahl–Foley quasiequilibrium.
(b) If inaction is possible for consumers and producers, the quasiequilibrium is nontrivial.
(c) If the quasiequilibrium is an equilibrium, then (pgh)h∈H 6= 0 and consequently
∑
h∈H p
g
h 6= 0.
Proof. Recall that in E ′ consumption and production sets are defined by
X ′h =
{
x′h ∈ L+ × (R
K
+ )
H : x′h =
(
xh, (G1,h, . . . , GH,h)
)}
,
Y ′f =
{
y′f ∈ L× (R
K)H : ∃(yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Yf , y
′
f =
(
yf , (y
g
1,f , . . . , y
g
H,f
))
, yh,f ≤ y
g
f ∀h ∈ H
}
,
and that for x′h =
(
xh, (G1,h, . . . , GH,h)
)
∈ X ′h, u
′
h(x
′
h) = uh(xh, Gh,h), defining the preferred sets
P ′h(x
′
h) := {x˜
′ ∈ X ′h : uh(x˜h, G˜h,h) > uh(xh, Gh,h)}.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 5.2, the allocation (x′h)h∈H =
(
xh, (0, . . . , G, . . . , 0)
)
h∈H
satisfies ∑
h∈H
(
(xh, (0, . . . , G, . . . 0)
)
=
∑
h∈H
x′h =
∑
h∈H
e′h +
∑
f∈F
y′f
=
∑
h∈H
(
ωh, (0, . . . , 0)
)
+
(∑
f∈F
yf ,
(∑
f∈F
ygf , . . . ,
∑
f∈F
ygf , . . . ,
∑
f∈F
ygf
))
and is an Edgeworth equilibrium consumption allocation of E ′, actually, in view of Assumption
A4, an element of its fuzzy core. Moreover, we deduce from Assumption A5 local non-satiation
of preferences in E ′ at each component
(
xh, (0, . . . , G, . . . , 0)
)
.
We first prove that for each h ∈ H, there is a convex set P̂ ′h(x
′
h) such that
• P̂ ′h(x
′
h) ∩
(
L+ × (R
K
+ )
H
)
= P ′h(x
′
h);
• x′h +
(
ω, (0, . . . , 0)
)
is a τ × (τRK )
H - interior point of P̂ ′h(x
′
h).
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In other words, we prove that each preference P ′h is (ω, (0, . . . , 0)
)
-proper at x′h =
(
xh, (0, . . . , G, . . . , 0)
)
.6
To see this, define
P̂ ′h(x
′
h) = {
(
xh, (G1,h, . . . , GH,h)
)
∈ L× (RK)H : (xh, Gh,h) ∈ P̂h(xh, G)}.
Both above conditions follow immediately from A.7.
We next prove that for each f ∈ F , there are a convex set Ŷ ′f (y
′
f ) ⊂ L × (R
K)H and a lattice
Z ′y′
f
⊂ L× (RK)H such that
• Ŷ ′f (y
′
f ) ∩ Z
′
y′
f
= Y ′f ;
• y′f −
(
ω, (0, . . . , 0)
)
is a τ × (τRK )
H - interior point of Ŷ ′f (y
′
f );
•
(
0, (0, . . . 0)
)
∈ Z ′y′
f
, and Z ′y′
f
− L+ × (R
K
+ )
H ⊂ Z ′y′
f
.
In other words, we prove that each production set Y ′f is (ω, (0, . . . , 0)
)
-proper at y′f =
(
yf , (y
g
f , . . . , y
g
f )
)
.7
To see this, define
Ŷ ′f (y
′
f ) =
{(
yf , (y
g
1,f , . . . , y
g
H,f )
)
∈ L× (RK)H : (yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Ŷf and y
g
h,f ≤ y
g
f ∀h ∈ H
}
;
Z ′y′
f
=
{(
yf , (y
g
1,f , . . . , y
g
H,f )
)
∈ L× (RK)H : (yf , y
g
f ) ∈ Zy′f ∀y
g
f ≥ sup
h∈H
ygh,f
}
.
From the previous definitions and Assumption A.8, it follows that
Ŷ ′f (y
′
f ) ∩ Z
′
y′
f
=
{(
yf , (y
g
1,f , . . . , y
g
H,f )
)
∈ L× (RK)H : (yf , , y
g
f ) ∈ Ŷf (yf ) ∩ Zyf = Yf
}
= Y ′f .
It is also easily verified that y′f −
(
ω, (0, . . . , 0)
)
is a τ × (τRK )
H - interior point of Ŷ ′f (y
′
f ), and that
Z ′y′
f
is a lattice comprehensive and containing the origin.
Applying Proposition 5.3.6 of Florenzano (2003), there exists pi =
(
p, (pg1, . . . , p
g
H)
)
∈ L′ ×
(RK)H such that pi ·
(
ω, (0, . . . , 0)
)
= p · ω > 0 and
(
(x′h)h∈H , (y
′
f )f∈F ,
(
p, (pg1, . . . , p
g
H)
))
is a
quasiequilibrium of E . The rest of the proof of a. is as in the proof of Proposition 5.2. The
assertion b. follows from the relation p · ω > 0. The proof of c. is identical.
Remark 5.5. An infinite dimensional equivalent of the finite dimensional irreducibility assumption
is
IR′: For any non-trivial partition {H1,H2} of the set H of consumers and for any feasible
allocation
((
(xh)h∈H , G
)
,
(
yf , y
g
f
)
f∈F
)
of E , there exist
(
(x˜h)h∈H , G˜
)
∈ (L+)
H × RK+ and
ω′ ∈ L+ such that
• uh(x˜h, G˜) ≥ uh(xh, G) ∀h ∈ H1, with a strict inequality for at least one h of H1;
•
(∑
h∈H x˜h, G˜
)
∈ {ω′}+
∑
f∈F Yf with, for some λ > 0, (ω
′ − ω) ≤ λ
∑
h∈H2
ωh.
As previously, a by-product of Proposition 5.3 is the following Lindahl–Foley equilibrium exis-
tence theorem:
Theorem 5.6. Assume that the dual pair 〈L,L′〉 satisfies SA. Under the assumptions A1–A8,
and IR′, the economy E has a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium
((
(xh)h∈H , G
)
, (yf , y
g
f )f∈F ,
(
p, (pgh)h∈H
))
with a private goods price vector p ∈ L′ satisfying p · ω > 0 and positive personalized price vectors
for public goods, pgh ∈ R
K
+ , h ∈ H, not all equal to zero.
6See Definition 5.3.6 of Florenzano (2003).
7See Definition 5.3.7 of Florenzano (2003).
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